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Upon Information and Belief
This issue marks the beginning of DICTA'S nineteenth year and
constitutes the first number of volume nineteen. At the time the present
board of editors took office, it was felt that some improvement could be
made in the typographical format of the magazine, but it was thought
that no change should be made in the middle of a volume. The changes
are not drastic but, realizing as we do the natural propensity of lawyers
to follow precedents and to look askant at any innovation, however
slight, we are all holding our breath. We hope you will like it, but in
the meantime, it is quite probable that your board of editors will be
pretty hard to find in the next week or so.
Henry Weihofen, who so magnanimously defended the United
States Supreme Court in a recent issue of DICTA,* has recently been
appointed Assistant Executive Director of the Board of Legal Examiners
in Washington, D. C. It is expected that he will be absent from the university for about two years. The Board will devise and give aptitude
tests to lawyers seeking government positions. While we would be the
last person to say so, it is possible, just barely possible, that Henry's
article, or at least the views expressed in his article, may have had something to do with his appointment. So the moral is, if you wa.nt a good
job, just write us an article. If it is good, we promise to publish it, and
you never can tell what will happen.
Louis 0. Kelso, a member of your board of editors, has been selected
to take over some of Mr. Weihofen's classes in the law school. During
the quarter just closed, Lou commuted back and forth between Denver
and Boulder so that he might meet with the classes on Constitutional
Law and Municipal Corporations.
Lawyers' stenographers must have a difficult time. No one knows
what her boss is going to say-sometimes not even her boss. The following is illustrative: A few days ago Colonel Van Cise dictated: "a
corporation cannot conceal itself." She wrote: "a corporation cannot
conceive itself." The following day, after the first error had been corrected, the Colonel dictated from the biblical quotation, "conceived in
*Weihofen, The Return to the Constitution (1941)
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sin," which -the young lady, not to be taken in twice, refined into
"received in sin."
Our Boulder correspondent informs us that Steph2n H. Hart of
Denver--Senator Hart to you-taught the class on Taxation in the law
school at Boulder for a short time in November. This course is one
usually handled by Dean Edward C. King. But Ed was forced to step
aside for a short time on account of illness, an illness which caused him
some inconvenience and considerably more embarrassment. He was
laid low with whooping cough which, so far as Ed was concerned,
arrived some thirty or forty years late.

Linthicum Foundation Offers
Thousand Dollar Prize
The faculty of the Northwestern University School of Law, administering the income of the Charles Clarence Linthicum Foundation,
announces that the sum of one thousand dollars and a bronze medal, as
a first prize, and the sum of five hundred dollars as a second prize, with
honorable mention, will be awarded to the authors of the best monographs submitted by January 10, 1943, an the subject, "Trademark
and Trade-Name Laws in the Americas: The Problem of Their Practical
Reconciliation."
Charles C. Linthicum (1857-1916) was graduated from Northwestern University in 1882, was president of the Patent Law Association of Chicago in 1899 and counsel in patent law for the United States
Steel Corporatian. He lectured for twenty years on Patent Law in the
Northwestern University School of Law. The Charles Clarence Linthicum Foundation, given in his honor and established by Harvey S. Firestone and other friends, is applicable to the general purpose of cultivating
research, study and instruction in the fields of the law of patents, trademarks, copyrights or other topics of law involving the development of
trade, industry and commerce.
To be eligible for the award the author must be at the date of submission a member of the bar or of a faculty of law, or a student registered
in a recognized law school, or a patent agent or attorney or a member of
a government staff in any country. Two or more persons may collaborate in the preparation of the monograph.
Full particulars may be obtained by writing the Linthicum Foundation, Northwestern University Law School, 357 East Chicago Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

Rights of Adult Where Minor
Misrepresents Age
BY GORDON SLATKIN*

The fact that minors are continuously making many purchases and
even engaging in business has resulted in much litigation, sometimes with
disastrous results to adults. Because of this, some business men go so
far as to refuse to deal with minors entirely and most good business men
now make it a practice to inquire as to the age of persons appearing close
to their majority.
The general rule is that a minor may rescind his contract by returning the consideration which he has received, or so much of it as remains.'
Some states add an additional qualification which, while allowing the
minor to rescind upon the return of the article purchased, holds the minor
liable for deterioration and depreciation.2 One state, Minnesota, has
adopted an anomalous rule under which the rights of the parties are
dependent upon the question of whether the contract was provident
from the minor's viewpoint. a But the rule concerning the return of
the consideration applies only to tangible property and in all jurisdictions it is held that if the infant obtains money, no right to recover is
given the adult in the absence of fraud.
Of course many transactions take place with persons admittedly or,
*Of the Denver bar.
'Arkansas Reo Motor Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975 (1924):
Creer v. Active Auto Exchange, 99 Conn. 266, 121 Atl. 888 (1923); Hauser v.
Marmon Chicago Co., 208 I11. App. 171 (1917) ; Story & C. Piano Co. v. Davy, 68
Ind. App. 150, 119 N. E. 177 (1918) ; Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, 124 Me. 10,
124 Atil. 725 (1924) : McCarthy v. Henderson. 138 Mass. 310 (1885) : Gillis v.
Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N. E. 813, 91 Am. Sc. Rep. 265 (1901): Reynolds
v. Garber-Buick Co., 183 Mich. 157, 149 N. W. 985, L. R. A. 1915C 362 (1914) :
Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs Co.. 197 N. C. 659, 150 S. E. 177 (1929); Standard
Motor Co. v. Stillians, 1 S. W. (2d) 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) : Blake v. Harding,
54 Utah 158, 180 Pac. 172 (1919); Price v. Furman. 27 Vt. 268. 65 Am. Dec.
194 (1855) : Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79. 31 Am. Rep. 678 (1878) : McNaughton v. Granite City Auto Sales, 108 Vt. 130, 183 Atl. 340 (1936): Snodderly v.
Bratherton, 173 Wash. 86, 21 P. (2d) 1036 (1933).
'Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664 (1887): Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y.
578, 55 N. E. 275, 47 L. R. A. 303, 73 Am. St. Rep. 303 (1899) ; Pettit v. Liston.
97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660, 11 A. L. R. 487 (1920): Sturgeon v. Starr, 17 West.
L. R. (Can.) 402 (1911); Valentini v. Canali, L. R. 24 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 166, 59
L. J. Q. B. N. S. 74, 61 L. T. N. S. 731, 38 Week. Rep. 331, 54 J. P. 295 (1889).
'Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W. 191
(1916).
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from their appearance, obviously minors, and in other cases where the
minor is near his majority, no questions are asked and no representations
concerning age are made. With those cases we are not now concerned
as the present discussion will be limited to the rights of the parties where
the minor has falsely represented that he was of age, and his appearance
was such that the adult might reasonably rely upon that representation.
ACTIONS FOR FRAUD OR DECEIT

Where the minor falsely represents himself as being of age at the
time the contract is made and then, taking advantage of his minority,
rescinds the contract, the usual action brought by the adult has been one
for fraud or deceit. 4 And there would seem to be no good reason why
such an action should not be sustained. For every other tort, the infant
is held liable, and surely when he deliberately and fraudulently induces
an adult to deal with him because of the adult's reliance on his statement
that he is of full age, he is not less culpable than when he injures another
by the negligent use of an automobile. He has been held criminally
liable for obtaining money under false pretenses because of a misrepresentation of his age, 5 and certainly it would be a poor rule which would
hold him guilty of a crime and subject to imprisonment for it and at
the same time relieve him from all civil liability for the same wrongful
and unlawful act. But the cases are not in accord on the question of
whether such an action can be maintained.
(a)

Action in fraud or deceit permitted.

By the weight of American authority, the minor is held liable for
6
his fraudulent deceit. The leading case is Fitts v. Hall. There the
he
was of age.
that
who
represented
plaintiff sold hats to the defendant,
'The theory of estoppel has been applied in a few cases but the cases applying the
doctrine have produced a hopeless confusion. As a general proposition, however, it
may be said that a majority of the courrts will not estop an infant from setting up his
correct age in an action at law but will in a suit in equity. But in La Rosa v. Nichols,
92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atil. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412 (1918). the court was of the opinion
that the distinction between law and equity ought not to govern the substantial rights
of the parties and that an estoppel should arise in both la w and equity actions. On
the other hand no estoppel is permitted under the rule of the federal courts either in law
or in equity. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300. 26 L. ed. 87 (1880).
It must be noted that n full application of the doctrine of estoppel would have
the effect of enforcing the contract. If the infant were estopped to rely upon his correct
age, then his liability would be measured. not by what he had taken from the adult, but
by what he had promised to do plus damages for failure to keep that promise. That
being so, the doctrine would go further than merely protect the adult against loss.
Moreover, it would take away most, if not all. of the protection which the law has
provided for the infant.
The cases on this subject are collected in three annotations in 6 A. L. R. 416, 18
A. L. R. 520 and 90 A. L. R. 144.
'Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 135 Ky. 32, 121 S. W. 967, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1101 (1909): 22 Am. Jur. 468, §44.
9 N. H. 441 (1838).
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When the plaintiff sued on the note given for the hats, the defendant
pleaded infancy. Thereafter the plaintiff brought an action for deceit,
and the court held:
"But the representation in Johnson v. Pie (1665), 1 Lev.
169, 1 Keble 905, 913, 83 Eng. Reprint 353, and in the present
case, that the defendant was of full age, was not part of the contract, nor did it grow out of the contract, or in any way result from
it. It is not any part of its terms, nor was it the consideration upon
which the contract was founded. No contract was made about the
defendant's age. The sale of the goods was not a consideration
for this affirmation or representation. The representation was not
a foundation for an action of assumpsit. The matter arises purely
ex delicto. The fraud was intended to induce, -and did induce, the
plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of the hats, but that by no
means makes it part and parcel of the contract. It was antecedent
to the contract; and if an infant is liable for a positive wrong
connected with a contract, but arising after the contract has been
made, he may well be answerable for one committed before the
contract was entered into, although it may have led to the contract.
It has been said that 'all the infants in England might be ruined,'
if infants were bound by acts that sound in deceit. But this cannot
be a reason why the action should not be maintained for fradulent
wrongs done, for the same reason would seem to apply equally well
in cases of slander, trover, and trespass. The latter are as much
the results of indiscretion as the former, and quite as likely to be
committed.-,
This case has been followed again and again by the courts of the
United States, and undoubtedly represents the majority rule.
A more recent case is Wisconsin Loan and Finance Corporation V.
Goodnough.8 In this case an infant signed a promissory note upon
which judgment was confessed. The infant thereupon came into 'court
and filed an answer setting up his infancy. The plaintiff, in reply,
alleged that the defendant fraudulently represented that he was of age.
The court recognized the two lines of authority but followed the rule
set out in Fitts v.Hall.' The Wisconsin court then set forth the conditions precedent to an action of fraud and deceit against a minor for misrepresentation:
"The cases quite uniformly hold that the fraud must be actual,
not constructive; that mere failure of the infant to disclose his age
is not sufficient. This quite apparently for the reason that the in7
Ibid. at 449.
'201 Wis. 101, 228 N. W. 484, 67 A. L. R. 1259 (1930).
'Supra note 6.
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fant himself may be unaware of the legal consequences of his acts,
and that it is his affirmative wrongdoing which leads to liability.
Some of the cases emphasize the fact that the infant must have had
actual discretion as opposed to legal discretion. That is a matter
it seems to use more properly disposed of in ascertaining whether or
not the person seeking to hold the infant reasonably relied upon the
representation made by him. Quite obviously a child 10 years of
age could not represent himself to be 21 years so as to warrant any
one dealing with him upon that representation." 10
The rule set out by the New Hampshire and Wisconsin courts
appears reasonable and just and a proper solution to the problem. It
has been followed in a number of other jurisdictions."
The Colorado Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this point.
However, Mosko v. Forsythe12 presents a somewhat analogous situation.
There the action was brought by the adult to replevin an automobile
under a chattel mortgage given for the purchase price of the car. To
this the defendant put in a plea of infancy and counterclaimed for the
amount paid by him on the purchase price. The court held that the infant could not counterclaim in an action of replevin since the only issue
involved was the right to possession. The court further held that before
an infant may disaffirm he must return the goods, but the court did not
state whether he must make restitution if the goods had been depreciated
or depleted. On page 118 we find this statement:
"Plaintiff, either with or without knowledge of defendant's
age, in the absence of any representationsthereof made by defendant, dealt with the latter at his peril, without ascertaining his age,
when the specific property obtained by defendant was not a necessity, and the authorities do not support any contention that an
automobile, under the facts here appearing, is a necessity."' 13 (Italics ours.)
The statement above appears to be dictum but there is at least an
implication that the adult might have a remedy if the minor had frauduleantly misrepresented his age.
Action in fraud or deceit denied.
As stated above, the weight of American authority holds that an
action for fraud or deceit may be maintained against an infant where
(b)

'0Supra note 8,at 109, 228 N. W. at 486.
"Davidson v. Young, 38 III. 145 (1865) ; Rice v.Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E.
420, 58 Am. Rep. 53 (1886) ; Yaeger v. Knight, 60 Miss. 730 (1883) : Eckstein v.
Frank, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863) ; Schunemann v. Paradise, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
426 (1873): Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 204, 1 At. 177 (1885): Kilgorev. Jordan, 17
Tex. 341 (1856); 27 Am.Jur. 818, §96.
"102 Colo. 115. 76P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
'"'Ibid. at 118, 76 P. (2d) at 1107-1108.
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the latter falsely represents that he is of full age. But a smaller, though
respectable, number of cases hold to the contrary. The rule that such
an action cannot be maintained is sometimes referred to as the English
or the Massachusetts rule. It finds its foundation in the case of Johnson
V. Pie.14 There the defendant falsely and fraudulently asserted that he
was of full age. He thereupon executed a mortgage to the plaintiff and
then repudiated the mortgage. It was held that the defendant was not
liable in fraud or deceit, and the reason given was that to hold him liable
for the tort would be to hold him liable on the very contract which the
minor had entered into with the plaintiff.
An analysis of this position clearly shows its error, because the
action is founded on deceit and not on contract, and the measure of
damage is the value of that which the adult has parted with on the faith
of the infant's misrepresentation and not what the infant promised to do
or what he promised to pay. It is true that if the contract were a reasonable one, the two might probably be nearly the same, but that is purely
a coincidence.
The rule laid down in Johnson v. Pie has been followed quite
generally by the English courts. But the injustice of the rule has been
the cause of many limitations.
The dissatisfaction of the English courts with their own rule is
probably best shown in the case of Leslie v. Sheill.15 In that case an
infant, misrepresenting that he was of age, obtained a loan of f400
from money lenders and the latter brought an action of deceit. The
court felt that it was obligated to follow the rule of Johnson v.Pie, but
from a reading of the whole opinion it can be seen that the court was
reluctant to do so. Said the court:
"As Lord Kenyon says in Jennings v. Rundall (1765), 3
Burr. 1804, alluding to Zouch v. Parson (1799), 8 T. R. 335,
at p. 337, 'this protection was to be used as a shield and not as a
sword; therefore if an infant commits an assault or utter slander,
God forbid that he should not be answerable for it in a Court of
justice. But where an infant has made an improvident contract
with a person who has been wicked enough to contract with him,
such person cannot resort to a Court of law to enforce such contract.' It is perhaps a pity that no exception was made where, as
here, the infant's wickedness was at least equal to that of the person
who innocently contracted with him, but so it is. It was thought
necessary to safeguard the weakness of infants at large, even though
here and there a juvenile knave slipped through. The rule is well
1

I Lev. 169. 1 Keble 905. 83 Eng. Rep. 353 (1665).
3 K. B. 607, Ann. Cas. 1916C 992 (1914).
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settled.
*

*

"10

No action of. deceit lay against the present appellant

But while the English courts have steadily held that an action for
fraud or deceit could not be maintained against the infant, it was held in
Valentini v. Canali' 7 that where the contract related to property or the
use thereof, before the minor was entitled to rescind he must make full
restitution, even in the absence of fraud. It would seem that this would
have the effect of enforcing the contract even more directly than if the
minor were held liable for his fraud.
It is difficult to see why an infant should be allowed to retain the
fruits of his fraud if it is money and be forced to return what he has
obtained if it is property. The mere fact that the infant must be sued
when he has obtained money and himself sue where he has obtained
property (his action being to recover back money that he has paid for
property) should provide no reason for the distinction. Nevertheless,
such is the English rule.
The courts of Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Vermont have carried the rule of non-liability of the infant
even beyond that followed by the English courts.," Massachusetts, in
particular, appears to give to an adult no protection whatever from a
conniving minor.1"
The courts of New York have arrived at a thoroughly inconsistent
result. In Steckly v. Normandy National Securities Corporation20 the
infant tendered back stock which he had purchased from the defendant
and then sued for the purchase price. In the meantime, while the infant
held the stock, it had greatly depreciated in value. The defendant pleaded
that the infant had fraudulently misrepresented his age and that the
defendant relied upon those statements in selling the stock. The court,
while approving Rice v.Butler,21 which held that the infant must pay
for wear, tear and depreciation regardless of whether he was guilty of
fraud or not, held that no counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation
or estoppel might be urged, thus apparently overlooking Eckstein v.
'"Ibid. at 612, Ann. Cas. 1916C at 993.
"7L. R. 24, Q. B. Div. 166, 59 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 74, 61 L. T. (N. S.) 731,
38 Week. Rep. 331, 54 J. P. 295 (1889).
'Monumental Building Assn. v. Herman. 33 Md. 128 (1870) ; Slayton v. Berry,
175 Mass. 513., 56 N. E. 574 (1900); Greensborough Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer,
185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E.'261 (1923); International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okla.
293, 98 Pac. 951 (1908): Nash v. Jewitt, 61 Va. 501, 18 Atl. 47 (1889).
In
Maryland, however, it isheld that the minor must make restitution even in the absence
of fraud. Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664 (1884).
"Slayton v. Berry, supra note 18.

2°263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726, 90 A. I.. R. 1437 (1934).
'Supra note 2.
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Frank22 and Schunemann v.Paradise,2 two early New York cases. The
New York court, therefore, reaches the inconsistent rule that even
though the minor be guilty of no fraud, if the transaction involves
tangible personal property which has been depleted or depreciated, the
minor before rescinding must put the adult in status quo, but if the
transaction involves intangible property as stocks which have depreciated in value while held by the infant, even though the infant be guilty
of fraud, no similar obligation is placed on the infant.
NECESSITY OF RESTITUTION

In Myers v.Hurley Motor Company24 the Supreme Court of the
United States probably definitely settled the rule with regard to the
necessity of restitution by the minor before he should be allowed to
rescind his contract. There the plaintiff, who was twenty years of age,
represented that he was twenty-four and on the faith of that representation was allowed to purchase an automobile from the defendant at a
price of $650. The plaintiff used the automobile for approximately six
months, made default in his payments under a conditional sales contract,
and finally the car was repossessed by the defendant. The plaintiff then
brought an action to recover back the amount he had paid down and the
payments which he had made on the conditional sales contract. The
defendant set up as a counterclaim the amount of money necessarily
required to repair the automobile in order to put it in the condition in
which it was before it was sold to the plaintiff.
Two questions were certified to the Supreme Court. The first was
whether the plaintiff was estopped by his misrepresentations to set up
his true age. The court noticed the conflict in the authorities but, following Sims v.Everhardt,25 held that an estoppel could not be pleaded
by the adult. The second question was whether the defendant, by way
of affirmative defense, might set up the amount paid to repair the damages to the car. In answering that question, the court held that an action
brought to recover back any part of the payments made was an action
in assumpsit to which equitable principles were applicable.
"How far the equitable maxim, that he who seeks equity must
do equity, applies generally in suits brought for relief because of
infancy, we need not inquire; nor do we need here to go as far as
the authorities just cited. The maxim applies, at least, where there
has been, as there was here, actual fraud on the part of the infant.
l Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863).
'46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426 (1873).
It should be pointed out that these two
early New York cases may not have been brought to the attention of the court since
neither is cited in 90 A. L. R. 1438, which gives the citations of counsel.
2273 U. S. 18. 47 S. Ct. 277, 71 L. ed. 515, 50 A. L. R. 1181 (1927).
102 U. S. 300, 26 L. ed. 87 (1880).
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When an infant of mature appearance, by false and fraudulent representations as to his age, has induced another person to sell and
deliver property to him, it is against natural justice to permit the
infant to recover money paid for the property without first compelling him to account for the injury which his deceit has inflicted
upon the other person.
"Our conclusion that the affirmative defense is available in this
action does not rest upon the doctrine of estoppel, though the result
may be the same. It recognizes the plaintiff's right to repudiate his
promise and sue for the return of his payments, and his immunity
from a plea of estoppel in so doing. Its effect is not to enforce the
disaffirmed contract directly or indirectly, but to allow him to invoke the aid of the court to enforce an equitable remedy arising
from the disaffirmance, only upon condition that 'seeking equity,
he must do equity.' And the application of maxim is not precluded
because defendant's claim might not be enforceable in any other

manner."20

This case seems to have been the turning point with reference to
the necessity of restitution where the minor was guilty of fraud. Two
cases from Ohio illustrate the change in thought. In Summit Auto Company v. Jenkins,2" which was decided before Myers v. Hurley Motor
Company, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that where a minor falsely
represented his age in purchasing an automobile, and where the seller
took possession thereof, the minor could recover the amount paid by
him without diminution for the use of the automobile or damages for
its depreciation. Later in Mestetzko t. Elf Motor Company28- the Supreme Court of Ohio, on similar facts, came to an altogether different
conclusion. Concerning Myers vT.Hurley Motor Company, the court
said:
"The court therefore held that, seeking to disaffirm and avoid
his contract, the court should deal with him as it would with an
adult party, and should require him to restore what he received
when he parted with the property which he seeks to get back, and
this the more especially where it appears that the other party dealt
with him in ignorance of the fact of his nonage. The court further
held that the amount of the vendor's damage could only be allowed
in abatement or diminution of the infant's claim, and that the
vendor could not in any event recover an affirmative judgment. All
these principles are declared by the highest authority in the land
upon a review and discussion of the authorities and are in harmony
'Supra note 24, at 26, 47 S. Ct. at 279, 71 L. ed. at 519.
'20 Ohio App. 229, 153 N. E. 153 (1925).
1119 Ohio St. 515, 165 N.E. 93 (1929).

DICTA
with our own views, and we therefore adopt them as the proper
principles of law to be applied in the retrial of this case.' '29
Another case following Myers v. Hurley Motor Company is Steiqerwalt v. Woodhead Company,30 decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. The court there found that the contract was not a provident one, under the peculiar Minnesota rule mentioned above 3 1 but held
on the authority of Myers v. Hurley Motor Company that the defendant
was entitled to recoup for the depreciation of the automobile and the
loss sustained in repairing the automobile.
Analyzing the rule, it will be noticed that it arrives indirectly at
the same conclusion that would have been reached directly had an action
in fraud or deceit by way of cross-complaint been permitted.
The rule of Myers v. Hurley Motor Company applies general rules
of tort law. But so far it has been applied and is perhaps impliedly
limited to those cases in which restitution may be urged as a set-offcases in which the infant has sought to recover moneys paid on the purchase price. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the rule
should be extended to permit the adult, in a direct action, to recover
money or property of which he has been defrauded by the infant's tort.
SUMMARY

In conclusion, we believe that the most advisable rule, the rule
which would protect the infant and at the same time protect the adult,
is the one holding an infant liable in an action for deceit where there is
fraud. This rule is not based on the contract but applies well known
and well established rules of tort law.
To require restitution, in the absence of fraud, will take away
much of the protection to which an infant is entitled. Not to permit
an action in fraud or deceit will leave an unsuspecting adult at the
mercies of a conniving infant. The doctrine of the necessity of restitution where there is fraud, announced in Myers v. Hurley Motor Company, is a good rule so far as it goes. But it was applied-perhaps limited in that case-to those instances in which it might be urged by way
of counterclaim to an action brought by the minor. However, there is
no reason why it should not apply as well to a direct action to recover
money or property furnished to an infant. While there have been no
cases in Colorado exactly in point, it is to be hoped that the Colorado
Supreme Court will follow the implication in Mosko v. Forsythe and
hold the infant liable in fraud or deceit.
-Ibid. at 584. 165 N. E. at 95-96.
'186 Minn. 558, 244 N. W. 412 (1932).
'Supra note 3.

"102 Colo. 115, 76 P. (2d)

1106 (1938).

Francis Eugene Bouck
BY NORRIS C. BAKKE*

Is it not strange that princes and
kings,
And clowns that caper in circus
rings,
Simple folk, like you and me,
Are workers for eternity?
To each is given a bag of tools,
A shapeless mass and a book of
rules,
And each must hew, 'ere time is

flown,
A stumbling block or a stepping
stone.
FRANCIS EUGENE BOUCK

We have met here today to honor the memory of a man whose life
was definitely a stepping stone to a higher and nobler life for many,
many people, and it is particularly fitting that this memorial service
should be held in Leadville, the place he loved to call his home, and the
community in which he gave the best years of his life a community
where he was known and loved by neighbors who felt that he belonged
to them.
While I feel highly honored to be privileged to speak to you on this
occasion, I am not unaware of my unworthiness for the task of appraising the life of one who rose to such heights in the service of his state; but,
as one of his associates on the Supreme Court, and as a fellow member
of his church, you have a right to ask me to pay your friend, and mine,
this tribute in your midst.
In proceeding, I shall bear in mind the motto of one of the organizations to which he blonged, and which is represented here this morn*Justice Colorado Supreme Court. This address was given at a memorial service
for Chief Justice Bouck in Leadville on November 30, 1941.
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ing: "The faults of our brothers we write upon the sands; their virtues
upon the tablets of love and memory."
Francis Eugene Bouck was born in New York City, November 25,
1873, and had he lived one more day he would have been sixty-eight
years of age. His father, a physician, died when Justice Bouck was only
seven years of age, consequently he was early in life charged with much
responsibility. There can be no doubt that because of his close association with his mother from that time on he had instilled into his life
some of those fundamental qualities which compel great achievements.
His mother was the daughter of one of the German leaders who, during
the revolution in 1848, sought to set up a democratic form of government
in Germany, but because of the failure of this attempt, he, with others,
was forced to flee to America. That those principles of freedom-a very
part of the mother-passed to the son was aptly demonstrated in Justice
Bouck's life. After completing his elementary education in Brooklyn,
he entered Columbia University, from which he received his bachelor's
degree in. 1895. He then entered upon the study of law at the same
institution, but moved to Denver before completing his course there. He
took his law degree in Denver in June, 1896. He was admitted to the
bar on June 22nd and immediately took up his residence in Leadville to
begin the practice of his profession.
It would be very interesting to pause here and discuss a few of the
contacts that he made with some of the outstanding personalities of Leadville of the time, such as Samuel D. Nicholson, Edward T. Taylor,
Simon Guggenheim and many others who have made history in Colorado. You may know that this twenty-three year old tenderfoot from
New York City had some great experiences. He exerted every effort to
qualify for service in the Spanish-American war, and did get as far as a
short residence in Camp Alva Adams near Denver. However, he was
finally rejected because of imperfect eyesight.
His service in this community is too well known to you to require
much comment, except to say that he served with distinction as city attorney, county attorney, deputy district attorney, and director of your public
library.
It was only natural that his service should attract statewide attention, and when Fred Farrar became attorney general in 1913, he named
Francis E. Bouck at his deputy, in which capacity he served until 1918,
when Governor Gunther appointed him as judge of the Fifth Judicial
District. In the fall of the same year he was elected to that office by the
people of this district, and reelected in 1924. During the time he was
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serving as district judge, he frequently assisted in the Denver courts, and
definitely established himself as one of the ablest judges in the state. It
was more or less inevitable that in 1932, when the Democratic party
was looking for an outstanding candidate for the Supreme Court, that
Judge Bouck should be given the nomination, and he was elected as a
justice of the Supreme Court in November, 1932, with an overwhelming
majority. He served in this capacity until January of this year, when he
became Chief Justice, in which capacity he was serving when he passed
away last Monday morning.
His greatest personal achievement was his scholarship. I think
none will deny that he was the most outstanding scholar to serve on the
Supreme Bench of this state. Not only was he a searching student of the
law, but his appreciation of the arts and sciences was a joy to those who
had the privilege to share it with him. He was an indefatigable reader
of the Masters, and his very soul was permeated with the finest of literature and art of the ages, making his society and companionship a thing
to be desired by those who love and search for the best things the world
has to offer.
It was no idle gesture on the part of the State Historical Society in
selecting Justice Bouck as its president. I have never known any other
man to have such an intimate knowledge of the state's history as did
Judge Bouck. This fact is important when you recall that he did not
come to Colorado until he had attained his majority. Not only was he
well acquainted with the leaders in nearly every county of the state in
recent years, but he knew, or was familiar with the activities, of most of
the men who had made any contribution to the history of his adopted
state. His service to the Historical Society in this connection was inestimable.
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Justice Bouck's alma
mater, defines a liberal as "one who builds upon the foundation of what
has been accomplished through the centuries in a growing and widening
civilization, and who goes forward in an open-minded constructive spirit
to guide the development of all this so that it will serve man's highest
and finest needs and ideals, and be kept in conformity with changing
facts and new needs." Dr. Butler could well have had Justice Bouck in
mind when he set forth that definition. Certainly, it was in just such a
spirit that Justice Bouck approached his work on the court, and particularly was it true when faced with questions involving construction of
provisions of the Constitution. He realized that the progress of civiliza-
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tion depended upon an upward and forward look, and that was the
direction of his vision. His conception of his work was similar to that
of one of the workers on St. Paul's Cathedral in London who, when
questioned by Sir Christopher Wren, the architect, as to what he was
doing, replied, "I am having a small part in a great work."
Justice Bouck had another outstanding characteristic-his absolute
sincerity-in which connection, I think the following story is appropriate: It has to do with the derivation of our word "sincere," and I hope
every time you sign your letters "Yours sincerely" you will remember
this. The word is made up of the two words, of Latin origin, sans cere,
being literally translated "without wax." The words came about because of a practice of certain sculptors in Rome who tried to cover up the
imperfections in their work by heating wax and working it into blemishes to fool the judges. The practice was soon discovered and prevented
thereafter by subjecting all the exhibits to great heat, which would melt
the wax and expose the imperfections, and only those sans cere would
be approved. All of Judge Bouck's work could stand that test.
I owe it to you people, gathered in this house of God, of the denomination with which Justice Bouck was affiliated, to speak of his
personal faith. I have already spoken of his scholarship, which, I now
add, included a pronounced familiarity with the Bible. While not presuming on my own knowledge of the Book, I confess that on several
occasions Justice Bouck pointed out to me names, places, circumstances,
and quotations from that source that could come only from one thoroughly familiar with it. No doubt many of you here today remember
when he served as superintendent of the Sunday school in this church,
and I say in this connection that such voluntary service in the Sunday
schools of America is one of the finest examples of devotion to faith.
Justice Bouck also served as an elder in this church, and while he never
boasted of it, I am sure that be felt in his heart that it was an honor, as
did President Benjamin Harrison when he said that the greatest honor
that had ever come to him in his life was when he was chosen as an elder
of his Presbyterian Church in Indianapolis. Justice Bouck, however,
was not the kind of man "to wear his religion on his sleeve," but rather
exemplified it in his daily life. It is illustrated by the following story,
which I know to be true: One of those cold, blustery days, when few
people venture out, Judge Bouck was driving with his family through
our City Park. He passed one of the familiar red-clothed popcorn vendors shivering in the cold as he offered his wares for sale. The Judge,
stopping his car, walked over to the man to make a purchase, paying with
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a liberal coin. Returning to the car, he remarked, "I guess that poor
fellow will not have very many customers today."
Another thing which I am sure the Judge would wish me to include
in this tribute was his love for the mountains. I am sure it was as much
this factor as anything that made him come to Leadville when he did.
The records of the Colorado Mountain Club show that for years he was
one of its most enthusiastic members, and his intimate knowledge of
many of our famous peaks was derived from their actual climbing by
him. Only those who share the enthusiasm for this exhilarating sport
can fully appreciate all that this meant to him.
Another thing that I think should be mentioned is that regarding
his affiliation with the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies. I say this because he spoke to me concerning it. He believed
very definitely that we face a grave crisis, and the freedoms about which
he had learned from his mother were in danger of being destroyed, and
he was very anxious for "all out aid." I cannot help but believe that
his grave concern for his beloved country in this hour hastened his
passing.
Judge Bouck would be the last man to think his name should ever
be mentioned together with that of Lincoln's, but I am reminded of a
tribute paid to Lincoln by my friend, T. V. Smith of the University
of Chicago, which closes with the thought: "How prudently we proud
men compete for nameless graves, while' now and then some starveling
There was something like
of Fate forgets himself into immortality."
that about Judge Bouck.
Finally, I believe the Judge would have me say a few words concerning something which I know was definitely a part of his faith, as
well as that of all of us who are here today. You all remember the experience of Job as it is related in the Old Testament, how after his great
affliction had come upon him, Job cried out, "Man that is born of woman
is of few days and is full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower and
is cut down. He giveth up the ghost and where is he? If a man die,
shall he live again?" Ever since then that same question has been reechoing in the hearts of men through the ages.
You people up here at Leadville know something about precipitation of metals when acted upon by various chemicals, and will appreciate
the following story: In the laboratory of the great Faraday, a workman
once inadvertently dropped a precious silver cup into a vat of acid. The
silver, as a consequence, was dissolved and the cup destroyed. The work-
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man went to the master chemist in great sorrow, telling of the great loss,
but the chemist replied, "No, the cup is not lost; it has only gone away
for a little while." Then he placed in the vat other chemicals that caused
the particles of silver to be precipitated upon the bottom in a shapeless
mass. It was then taken to the silversmith, who fashioned a new and
even more beautiful cup than the one before. It was a new cup, and yet
it was the same. It had gone away for a little while, but it lived again.
So we believe, and in this memorial service we reconsecrate ourselves
in the belief that we shall see and know Judge Bouck again.
"Not till the loom is silent,
And the shuttles cease to ply,
Will God unfold the canvas
And explain the reason why
The dark threads are as needful
In the weaver's skillful hand
As the threads of gold and silver
In the pattern he has planned."

Denver Bar to Discuss Total Defense
The next meeting of the Denver Bar Association will be held at
12:15 P. M., on January 5, 1942, in the Chamber of Commerce dining
room. Several speakers will treat various phases of the general topic,
"A discussion of Total Defense-National, State and Local." Colonel
Early W. Duncan, commanding officer of Lowry Field, will speak on
"The Federal Program in the Denver Area", W. H. Leonard, Coordinator of the Colorado State Defense Council, will discuss "State Defense Problems," and Mayor Benjamin F. Stapleton will detail "The
Work of the Denver Citizen's Council for National Defense." Following this, the meeting will be thrown open to general discussion.

For Sale
Due to lack of space we offer for sale a complete set of Pacific
Reporter and volumes 1-114, inclusive, of the Pacific Second. Telephone
TAbor 5111, Denver.

Institute Programs Planned for
Each District of State
The program for the winter institutes of the Colorado Bar Association has been completed, according to Edward L. Wood of Denver, chairman of the institute committee. Institutes have been scheduled in Greeley
on February 28th, in Loveland during January, probably January 17th,
and in El Paso County in March. The exact details and places of other
institutes will be announced in a later issue of DICTA, but present plans
call for meetings to be held in each district of the state. A medical-legal
institute has been planned for Denver in the early spring. Successful
institutes have already been held in Pueblo, Denver and Durango.
A special endeavor is being made this year to secure the participation
of lawyers from each of the localities of the state as speakers on institute
programs. Another innovation is the fact that addresses of the various
speakers have been reduced in length not to exceed one hour, the general
plan being to have talks averaging about fifteen minutes to half an hour.
The state has been divided into four districts and each vice president
of the state bar association is responsible for the planning of institutes
within his district. A broad outline of subjects has been carefully worked
out by the committee, and while the various districts are not limited to
that outline, it is thought that the plans there suggested present subjects
of greatest interest to lawyers at the present time.
Officials of the various local bar associations are urged to get in touch
with the vice president of the state bar association from their district and
make all plans for institute meetings through that official. The vice
presidents of the state bar are Philip S. Van Cise of Denver, Clay R.
Apple of Greeley and Eugene 1-1. Mast of Grand Junction.
The present outline of suggested topics for law institutes has been
worked out in detail and speakers are now available on each of the topics
listed.
I.

Insurance, the discussion to include treatment of some or all of the
following topics:
(a)
The automobile liability insurance policy-a step by step
analysis of its important provisions.
(b) Judgments in excess of insurance policy limits.
(c) Treatment of "insurance suggestions" in jury trials.
(d) The incontestable clause.
(e) Suicide as an accident.
(f)
Life insurance and taxation.
(g) Insurance assets in relation to the laws of execution and
bankruptcy.
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Insurance u.nder the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act.
The trend in revision of policy forms and broadening of
coverages.
What constitutes total disability?
The authority of a soliciting agent.

II.

Negligence, the discussion to include treatment of some or all of
the following topics:
Actions for malpractice.
(a)
(b) Occupational disease liability in Colorado.
(c) Res ipsa loquitur and automobile litigation.
(d) Legal problems arising in the compromise settlement of
claims.
(e) Preparation of a personal injury case.
(f)
Last clear chance.
(g) Proximate cause.

III.

Employer-Employe Laws, the discussion to include treatment of
some or all of the following topics:
The union-its organization and rights (organization,
strikes, lockouts, pickets, closed shop, boycotts, right to sue
and be sued).
(b) The Colorado Industrial Commission and its place in industrial disputes.
(c) The National Labor Relations Act.
(d) Labor injunctions.
(e) Unemployment compensation and social benefits.
Recent developments in workmen's compensation.
(f)
(g) The Wage and Hour Law-its coverage and its liabilities
and penalties.
Wills and Titles, the discussion to include treatment of some or
(a)

IV.

all of the following topics:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

The drafting of a will-a step by step analysis of all essential provisions.
Joint and mutual wills.
A model demonstration of the examination of an abstract of
title.
Questions arising under the recording acts-with reference
to the propriety or advisability of recording certain types of
instruments.
Corporation conveyances.
Problems in the establishment of heirship.
Corrective statutes.

Judge Lumkin Masterminds
The Master Docket*
Ain't nothin' like havin' friends, 'specially friends which take you
out to eat. An' when you get some good idees along with the eatin'well you just can't beat it.
Three-four weeks ago, me an' Jake an' Olie rides into Denver with
a couple of cars of steers. We sells the steers all right an' then Saturday
afternoon while I'm doin' a little shoppin', Jake an' Olie decides to look
over the town. I gets my shopping done, sees a picture show an' ends
up at the hotel 'bout midnight, but there ain't no signs of Jake and Olie.
Next morning, Jake calls me an' says him an' Olie is in jail. Seems like
they had too much snake-eye, an' as near as Jake can remember, some
cops objected to their throwing pavin' bricks at the street lights.
Well, I goes right down to the jail to get 'em out, 'cause our train's
leavin' shortly after noon, but it weren't no use, 'cause the judge don't
bold no court on Sundays, an' on top of that, them two hombres just
ain't in no condition to get out nohow.
Monday morning, them bein' pretty well sobered up, the judge
slaps 'em each with a fine, which me havin' paid, I'll take out of their
wages, an' then-but here I'm gettin' ahead of myself.
Monday morning while I'm waiting for court to open, I ruins into
a friend of mine who says the Denver'Bar Association is havin' a noon
meetin' an' wouldn't I like to come. I says I would, and then just to be
sure them two ornery cowpokes is ready to go home on time, I lets 'em
go back to jail an' don't pay their fines 'til the meetin's over.
An' man, it was a meetin', too. All them city lawyers sittin'
round, an' the head table pret' nigh filled up with Supreme Court
judges. Districk judges just weren't nobody, they for the most part
being spread 'round with the common lawyers.
Everybody's talkin' 'bout law all the time, but mostly 'bout suits
for defamation of character, an' the dismissal of same-all with examples, or maybe I should say with a example. The food ain't bad neither,
what with the leftovers from Thanksgivin'.
An' then when the eatin's over, President Colonel Van Cise calls
the meetin' to order an' right away chucks the job of presidin' on to Tom
Keely, which the latter does right well. The subject for discussion,
'cording to Keely, is the Master Docket.
*By Judge Homer P. Lumkin of the DICTA staff.
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So that you can understand the whole business, it seems like under
this Master Docket, all the cases which is to be tried is put in a hat an'
then you shake the hat an' the presidin' judge deals out the cases, face up,
to the five trial judges. When your case comes up, you're s'posed to be
ready for trial, an' God help you if you ain't.
Judge Stan Johnson talks first on "the views of the bench," an',.
'cording to him, the bench's views is mostly pretty rosy. He says right
off that everybody might as well get it through their heads that the Master Docket was thought up for the convenience of the court an' not for
the convenience of lawyers. An' then he goes on to say that, all on
'count of the Master Docket, the courts can try eight cases a week, 'stead
of six as before; that the cost is 'bout a third of what it used to be; that
anybody who wants to try a case can do it a'lot sooner: that cases 'rising
out of the same thing can now be tried together, and that, seein's how
the same judge set all the cases, lawyers don't have to worry no more
'bout havin' to try two cases at the same time. (Seems though this last
didn't work out so well, mainly on 'count of Judge Symes an' Judge
Kettering an' the two J. P.'s an' the police judge not bein' members of
the Master Docket.) Then the judge says, "You might think it ain't
so good on 'count of," an' names a few kicks. "But," he says,
"that really ain't so bad because-," an' he knocks down every kick
just as neat as pickin' blackbirds off a bob wire fence.
The judge is right slick in everything he says an' he acts like he
really means it. I s'pose he does, 'cause seems like him an' them other
judges thought up this Master Docket. But I can't help thinking that
the whole idea is sorta immoral an' sinful. When I was readin' law,
folks used to think it was bad to put suin' ideas into other people's heads,
but with this Master Docket, suin's gonna get so cheap an' easy, it's just
like askin' people to sue somebody.
Well, the judge's idees is answered by Art Laws, an' does he answer
'em? He started right off by readin' some rules of court which says that
courts is made for litigants (an' I s'pose their lawyers) an' not litigants
for courts. An' then he reads another one which says that judges should
pay 'tention to the time of litigants an' their lawyers. Them two rules
is hot enough, but he goes on an' says judges would have less trouble
followin' rules like that if they'd been lawyers before they was judges,
or if they was, then if they'd try an' remember what it felt like.
'Bout that time, somebody sittin' at the table just 'cross from mine
leans over to one of them districk judges-I won't tell you which onean' says, seems like Laws musta just lost a law suit. An' the judge says
he don't know 'bout that, but if he ain't, he's sure goin' to.
Well, Laws says that the only excuse he's ever seen offered for the
Master's Docket-that's what he calls it, the Master's Docket-is that it
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makes suin' cheap an' speedy, an' he don't think that's enough reason
for all the trouble it's been causin'. More'n that, he says he ain't never
found any way of knowing for sure just when the Masters gonna call
his Docket.
After all that, Laws calms down a little and says that maybe it'll
work out all right if the presidin' judge'll just bend his back a trifle an'
if the judges'll try and get it out of their heads that all defense lawyers
is just plain heels.
If I'd been Laws, I reckon I'd been kinda scairt to of said all he did.
I s'pose a lot of other people felt the same way, but from the amount of
clappin,' it seems like they was plenty glad to have somebody else say it.
Then Percy Morris talks on the relationship of pre-trial conference
to the Master Docket, an' from what he said, there weren't none. The
judges, Perce says, has been so busy tryin' cases under the Master Docket
that they ain't had time to have any pre-trial conferences. But, he says.
maybe when they get caught up on trials, then they'll have more time
for pre-trial conferences, which'll do away with some trials an' shorten
all the rest an' that way the trials won't take so long, an' then they'll
have more time for pre-trial conferences, which will give 'em more time
for
Well, you can see that the whole thing gets goin' faster an'
faster all the time, an' somebody says that if it keeps on, maybe five
districk judges might be enough an' then two of 'em will have to go
backor start, whichever it might beto practicin' law.
The last speaker who has writ down what he's gonna say sits
down, an' then Keely says anybody else who has anything to say, can.
So Al Vogl gets up an' says that he thinks they ought to have a sorta
Master Judge like they had, or anyway thought 'bout havin', in 1912.
This Master Judge, says Al, could adjudge all the pleadin'-that way
maybe gettin' some uniformity-have all the pre-trial conferences an'
then deal out the cases to the other judges for trial. Al don't say so, but
I'm thinking maybe he figures that since the trial judge wouldn't know
nothin' 'bout the case 'till he gets it, maybe he wouldn't decide it 'till
after the trial.
Lowell White says the Master Docket's all right in some ways, but
he don't like the way some judges is always suggestin' that he hire some
other lawyer to try his case just 'cause he'd already agreed to try a case
on that day over in Judge Symes' court. An' that's partic'ly bad when
he's maybe taken the case at less than scale, an' if be has to pay what
the union says to somebody else, he's gonna end up by losin' money.
Likewise, Lowell says, when one pardner, who's handled and maybe
knows somethin' 'bout the case, is sick or out of town or playin' golf,
the judge oughtn't to shy away from settin' the case over for the other
pardner, who don't pretend to know nothin' 'bout it.
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Well 'bout that time Clyde Barker says he'd like to hear what Judge
Symes thinks 'bout pre-trial conferences. Tom Keely, presidin', says if
Barker really wants to know, he might read the judge's article in the last
DICTA, an' besides there Weren't enough time left for the judge to talk.
Ward Bannister says maybe the judge knows somethin' about it which
he didn't say in DICTA, an' then follows up with a motion that there
was time for the judge.
I don't rightly know just what is happenin' after that, 'cause while
everybody is so wrought up, I snakes in that last stalk of celery, but
whatever it is, it don't take long, 'cause the next thing I know Judge
Symes is talkin'. He says pre-trial conferences is 0. K. in his court, an'
that a lot of cases has been settled right after the conference.
After that Keely don't take no more chances, but passes the meetin'
right back to the Colonel, an' the latter declares same adjourned.
Now meetin's like that is all right, but if you don't get nothin' but
eats an' what people says, then you're missin' somethin'. You ought
to get some idee of your own, which I did, and I'll tell you what it is.
A long time ago, it was gener'ly s'posed that people who knew
somethin' 'bout the facts was in a better position to decide who was right
than anybody else. That bein' so, the witnesses an' the jury was usually
the same. Then they passed some new rules an' decided that it was all
right if the jurors was witnesses, but it weren't necessary. Finally somebody said-fellow name of Coke, I believe-that witnesses oughtn't to
be jurors, the thought bein' that if the jury didn't know nothin' 'bout
the case, they couldn't decide it 'till all the witnesses had had their say.
Well, I'm thinkin' that if that was good for jurors, it ought to
work just as well with judges. An' if you carried out Al Vogl's idee,
then the trial judge wouldn't know nothin' 'bout the facts 'til the day
of trial.
An' then we pick up Lowell White's idee-ain't no point in stoppin' with the jury an' the judge. We could just let the pardner who
don't pretend to know nothin' 'bout the case do the tryin'. In some
cases I've seen, it'd work just as well to let the other one, or maybe even
both of 'em.
But when you get that far, you've got the jury, the judge an' the
lawyers all knowin' nothin' 'bout the case, so none of them can pull any
skullduggery. After all, the only two troubles anybody has in tryin'
law suits is the facts an' notions somebody had before the trial started.
Rules of evidence bein' as they is, any good judge ought to be able to
keep the facts clear out of the case. An' then if nobody knows nothin'
'bout the case, they just natur'ly can't have any bad idees.
So what do you get? I'll tell you. Justice! Justice, as sweet an'
pure as a mountain crick.
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Placement Bureau Completes Second Successful
Year; Fills Need of Legal Profession
for Employment Problems.
BY MARK H. HARRINGTON*

The Junior Bar Section of the Colorado Bar Association, formerly
known as the Colorado Junior Bar Conference, has had a placement
committee for the last two years. The manner in which the committee's
efforts were received by the bar, and the results which were achieved, have
demonstrated that the work of this committee must be a permanent part
of the program of the Junior Bar Section.
The committee has attempted to operate as a central clearing house
for young attorneys interested in finding positions in law offices and for
established attorneys interested in finding suitable associates. The experience of the committee has been that at times there has been a demand,
not only for attorneys who have been newly admitted to the bar, but
also for young attorneys with a few years' practical experience.
The committee has registered all applicants who sought its aid and
has now established a file containing the names of men who are available
for new positions. The file also contains information concerning the
training, character, ability and experience of the applicants. The work
has been carried out on a confidential basis. No information has been
given with respect to the identities of the applicants except to lawyers
and firms seeking new associates. Likewise, the knowledge that a particular lawyer or firm was seeking a new associate was treated in confidence. It was believed that this plan of operation was essential to the
success of the committee's efforts. The services of the committee have
been sought not only by members of the Denver bar, but also by attorneys located in other parts of the state.
The committee has also undertaken to advise young lawyers who
are seeking a proper location to establish themselves in the independent
practice of law. In connection with this part of the committee's activities, the committee is now undertaking to obtain a sponsor for the young
attorney just beginning to practice. This sponsor is in all cases a member of the bar. He is requested to give aid and assistance to the new
practitioner in the form of advice on matters of procedure, office management, and customs and practices peculiar to the local community. It is
not expected that the sponsor will furnish any financial assistance or aid
the young practitioner in obtaining clients, nor give advice on matters of
substantive law. In short, the sponsor will be asked to help the young
attorney bridge the gap between law school and practice by advising him
with respect to those matters of practice and procedure which become
known only by active participation in the practice of our profession.
*Of the Denver bar, chairman of placement committee.
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The success of the committee's efforts depends upon the willingness
of the younger members of the bar to register with the committee and
upon the willingness of the established members of the profession to
make use of its facilities; consequently, it is hoped that the committee
will receive the cooperation of all members of the bar. No charges of
any kind are made, and the records of the committee are kept at the office
of the chairman, 1020 First National Bank Building, Denver. The
personnel of the committee is as follows:
Denver
Mark H. Harrington (chairman)
Pueblo
Joseph L. Peterson ---Longm ont
T heodore D . Schey, Jr ----------------------------------------Cecil S. Haynie -----Grand Junction
Durango
Frederic B. Emigh
Sterling
Charles Kreager, Jr.
------------------------------M ontrose
H arry H aw thorne -------------------

Draft Affects Enrollment in Law Schools
Because of the greater average age of men in the law schools, the
Selective Service Act has caused a marked decrease in the enrollment in
these schools. For example, while the enrollment for the last quarter
in the University of Colorado as a whole fell off approximately four
per cent., the enrollment in the law school dropped thirty-one per cent.
In the academic year of 1939-1940, the law school had one hundred
twenty-six students. In the last quarter the number was seventy-six.
It is said that this tendency prevails generally in law schools over the
country, and with the entry of the United States in the war, it is expected
that the tendency will become even more pronounced.

Otero County Bar Meets
The Bar Association of Otero County held its annual meeting at
La Junta, Colorado, and elected George S. Cosand of La Junta, president.
W. L. Gobin of Rocky Ford was elected vice president and Robert R.
Sabin of La Junta was elected secretary and treasurer.

Colorado Bar Calendar
January 9-10, 1942 Meeting of Judges at Glenwood Springs
Institute at Loveland
January 17, 1942
------------------Institute at Greeley
February 28, 1942
-- Institute at Colorado Springs
March, 1942
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YOU ARE LOOKING FORLegal Blanks
Minute Books
Stock Record Books
Seals, etc.
Steel Shelves and Book Cases
Filing and Transfer Cabinets
Desks, Chairs, Safes
Fluorescent Desk Lamps
Typewriter and Legal Papers
Ribbons and Carbon Paper
Typewriter Stands
Come in, Phone or Write

Kendrick-Bellamy
Stationery Co.

Address all inquiries and offers to

Corner 16th & Stout, Denver

JAMES A. BROBECK, Administrator
STEAMBOAT SPRINGS. COLO.

KEystone 0241

Congratulations on Your Anniversary

M. L. SEAMON

THE MERCHANTS
FIRE INSURANCE CO.

General Cement Contractor

OF DENVER, COLORADO

All Kinds of Cement Work-All Types
of Remodeling Done Right-"Nothing
Too Large or Too Small"

J. R, GARDNER, President

GARDNER AGENCY, INC.
Denver Agents

Denver, Colorado
2314 Federal Blvd.
Phone GLendale 4248

640 Gas & Electric Bldg.

SEASON'S GREETINGS
to the LEGAL PROFESSION

ANNIVERSARY

Lock Joint Pipe
Company
TAbor 1643

1716 California

Frank Mcl
Symes Bu
Denv4

DENVER

Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage

KE. 6550

